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  11. Introduction 
 
Before the financial crisis of 1997, foreign bank entry was strictly regulated in 
Thailand. However, following the crisis, these restrictions were relaxed as part of the 
financial reforms, and foreign bank penetration increased substantially. This development 
is expected to be a significant catalyst for change in the domestic banking industry. 
Further financial deregulation is expected under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements and the presence of foreign financial institutions is expected to continue 
increasing. 
A number of empirical studies have examined the effects of foreign bank entry on 
bank performance in transitional and emerging market economies. However, most of 
these relate to central European and Latin American countries, where foreign bank entry 
intensified from the early 1990s. Except for the pioneering research of Unite and Sullivan 
(2003), there have been few formal economic studies of the effects of foreign bank entry 
on Asian banking. To our knowledge, the only academic study on Thai banks is a seminal 
work by Chantapong (2003). 
This paper investigates the impact of foreign bank entry on Thai domestic banks by 
using panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002. This paper 
expands the results of Chantapong in three respects. First, Chantapong focuses on the 
postcrisis period (1995–2001), whereas we examine the entire development period of 
foreign entry from the 1990s. Second, while Chantapong’s approach to estimation is ad 
hoc and lacks theoretical foundations, the estimated equations in this paper are based on 
microeconomic analysis. Third, compared with Chantapong’s paper, this paper presents a 
more comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting bank performance. These include 
changes in the foreign ownership of banks, changes in financial regulations, and changes 
in market structure. 
This paper comprises five sections. In section 2, we briefly review related studies, 
including recent studies of Asian banking markets and then summarize their major 
findings and limitations. In section 3, drawing on previous studies, we explain the 
expected effects of foreign entry on Thai domestic banks. In section 4, we present an 
overview of the evolution of foreign bank entry in the Thai banking market between 1990 
and 2002. In section 5, we present a regression analysis of the impact of foreign entry. In 
section 6, we summarize the empirical results and offer suggestions for further research. 
Our analysis indicates that an increase in foreign bank presence leads to a rise in 
overhead expenses, a decline in profits, and an increase in the interest spreads of 
domestic banks. In the short run, foreign bank entry is likely to have negative effects on 
the operations of domestic banks by increasing competition. In the long run, however, the 
overall performance of domestic banks is expected to improve. 
 
2. Related Studies 
 
There have been many empirical studies examining the effects of foreign bank entry 
in developing countries. The studies are based on bank-level panel data from financial 
statements, which are analyzed by pooling cross-bank time series data with balance-sheet 
data and income statement ratios for domestic and foreign banks. 
  2Most existing studies relate to eastern and central European countries and Latin 
American countries, where foreign bank entry became intense in the late 1980s. These 
studies include those by Barajas et al. (2000), Claessens and Jansen (2000), 
Bhattacharaya et al. (1997), Clarke et al. (2001), Claessens et al. (2001), Denizer (1999), 
Levine (1996), and Litan et al. (2001). 
These studies can be classified into two groups: those that examine effects across 
countries, and those that focus on the effects of foreign bank entry on particular countries. 
Both cross-country and single-country studies use simple regression on an equation of the 
form shown below. The dependent variables, X, are efficiency or activity indicators that 
are considered to represent different aspects of bank performance, such as cost efficiency, 
profit efficiency, lending activity, and loan quality. The independent variables are a set of 
foreign bank entry indicators, FOR, and other control variables that are expected to affect 
bank performance. The control variables typically include a vector of bank-specific 
indicators,  BS, a vector of banking-sector structure variables, BSD, and a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, MACRO. 
 
() MACRO BSD BS FOR f X , , , =  
 
These empirical studies indicate that foreign entry has a positive impact on bank 
performance in transitional and emerging market economies. According to the World 
Bank’s (2001) summary of these studies, an increased presence of foreign banks in the 
market has the following effects. (1) It reduces the profits of domestic banks. (2) It 
improves the operational efficiency of domestic banks in the sense that their operational 
expenses fall. (3) While foreign bank entry introduces new financial services and new 
technology into the markets, it also tends to reduce the credit quality of domestic banks, 
which might generate financial instability. 
Since foreign bank entry was strictly regulated in Asian countries before the Asian 
crisis of 1997, there have been few studies of foreign penetration of the Asian banking 
industry. Unite and Sullivan’s (2003) pioneering work examines the effects of foreign 
bank entry on domestic banks in the Philippines between 1990 and 1998. Applying the 
methodology adopted by studies on other emerging markets, Unite and Sullivan found 
evidence of the following. (1) Interest rate spreads narrow and operating expenses decline 
as foreign bank entry increases. (2) Foreign bank entry is directly related to increased risk. 
These findings are similar to those of Denizer (1999), Claessens et al. (2001), and Barajas 
et al. (2000). From these findings, Unite and Sullivan draw the following conclusions. (1) 
Foreign competition induces domestic banks to be more efficient. (2) The increased 
competition induced by foreign entry forces domestic banks to take on less creditworthy 
customers. (3) Foreign participation induces domestic bank managers to increase 
spending on modernizing their operations. Overall, Unite and Sullivan conclude that 
liberalization of the foreign presence has had positive effects on the Philippines’ domestic 
banking market. 
The only formal academic study of Thai banks is the seminal work of Chantapong 
(2001).
1 Applying the methodologies used by Claessens et al. (2000), Weller (1999), and 
                                                 
1 Chantapong (2001) analyzes descriptively how the operational performances of foreign banks 
differ from those of Thai domestic banks. 
  3Sabi (1996), Chantapong (2003) used regression analysis to investigate the performance 
of domestic and foreign banks in terms of their profitability, operational costs, quality of 
credit, and commitment to the Thai economy. The major findings are as follows. (1) 
Foreign banks were more profitable than domestic banks. (2) Both domestic and foreign 
banks improved their profitability following the Asian crisis period. (3) The gap between 
the profitability of domestic and foreign banks narrowed in the postcrisis period. 
Although Chantapong provides suggestive information on the effects of foreign entry 
on Thai banks, the analysis has limitations. First, Chantapong focuses on the postcrisis 
period (1995–2001). It does not cover the precrisis period of the 1990s when restrictions 
on foreign capital inflows were deregulated and the presence of foreign banks increased. 
Second, Chantapong’s classification of foreign banks is problematic.  According to 
Chantapong’s classification, only purely foreign-owned banks, which are 100% owned 
by foreigners, are categorized as foreign banks, whereas joint-venture banks that are 
majority owned by foreigners are not treated as foreign banks. Purely foreign-owned 
banks were not allowed to have a branch network in Thailand and, consequently, their 
business operations focused on the wholesale markets centering on foreign companies 
operating in Thailand. By contrast, joint-venture banks have between 50 and 60 branches 
and operate in both retail and wholesale markets. The main competitors to Thai domestic 
banks are the joint-venture banks that were acquired by foreign investors under the 
financial reforms following the crisis. Chantapong’s classification of Thai banks is not 
appropriate for examining the effects of foreign bank entry and, consequently, his 
empirical findings are misleading. Third, as in other studies, Chantapong does not explain 
the channels through which foreign penetration affects bank performance. In addition, the 
estimated equations adopted in the empirical analysis are ad hoc and lack theoretical 
foundations. These limitations make it difficult to interpret the estimation results and 
weaken the economic implications of the analysis. Fourth, Chantapong’s regression 
analysis only focuses on the effects of foreign bank entry through changes in ownership 
structure. Effects of foreign entry that operate through different channels, such as changes 
in market concentration caused by foreign entrants, and changes in the market share of 
foreign banks, are ignored by Chantapong. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of foreign bank entry on Thai domestic banks 
by using panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002. This paper 
represents an extension of that of Chantapong in three respects. First, we examine the 
entire development period of foreign entry, which was initiated by the financial 
liberalization of the early 1990s and accelerated by the financial reforms following the 
financial crisis. Second, to avoid using ad hoc empirical analysis, we carefully categorize 
banks and choose variables for the estimated equations on the basis of microeconomic 
foundations. Third, in this paper, we examine more comprehensively different factors that 
affect bank performance including changes in foreign ownership of banks, changes in 
financial regulations, and changes in market structure. 
 
3. Predicted Effects of Foreign Entry on the Thai Banking Market 
  4The entry of foreign banks affects the operational behavior of domestic banks through 
different routes. We briefly explain the paths through which increases in foreign 
penetration affect the business behavior of domestic banks.
2 
 
3. 1 The impact of foreign bank entry 
If foreign banks are no different from existing domestic banks, the effect of foreign 
bank entry is merely an increase in the number of market players. However, foreign 
banks are generally recognized to have characteristics that domestic banks do not possess. 
Hence, the entry of foreign banks is expected to have an impact on the domestic banking 
market that cannot be explained by traditional theories such as the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis. 
An important feature associated with foreign bank entry is that it introduces new 
financial services and advanced management skills, which existing domestic banks lack. 
The new technology and skills introduced by foreign banks include new financial 
products, advanced IT technology, and sophisticated bank management techniques. These 
are expected to contribute to lower operational expenses, increased profitability, and 
improvements in bank risk management. Motivated by market competition, domestic 
banks may imitate the new financial products and management skills. 
Another important feature of foreign banks is their pursuit of the profit motive. They 
are also independent of the vested interests of other banks because they do not form 
coalitions to make excessive profits. On the other hand, existing domestic banks lack 
effective monitoring procedures and depend on relational banking practices. Foreign 
penetration is expected to weaken vested interests between domestic banks and promote 
market competition. 
 
The influence of foreign banks on the market environment 
Entry by foreign banks affects the market environment in a way that entry by 
domestic banks cannot. Unlike domestic entrants, foreign entrants enhance the market by 
introducing new technology and management skills. Facing new foreign competitors, 
domestic banks are forced to react to new market entrants that differ substantially from 
existing domestic banks. In this context, in addition to a change in the market 
concentration ratio, the presence of foreign market players is significant. 
One measure of the influence of foreign penetration in a banking market is the 
proportion of foreign banks in the banking market. In existing studies, the proportion of 
foreign banks has been measured in terms of the number of banks or in terms of total 
assets, loans, and deposits. If foreign and domestic bank entries have different effects on 
market competition, an increase in the foreign presence in the market is expected to affect 
domestic bank performance in a way that cannot be explained by either the SCP 
paradigm or the efficiency hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
2 Although the effects of foreign bank entry have been estimated in many studies, some do not explain 
clearly the channels through which the effects of foreign bank entry operate. 
  5The change in ownership structure 
In addition to the impact on the market environment, majority ownership of domestic 
banks by foreign investors is likely to affect the business performance of domestic banks 
through restructuring and reorganization. Although banks are not majority owned by 
foreign investors, increased foreign ownership is expected to have a substantial impact on 
domestic bank performance.
3  Following the financial crisis in 1997, foreign bank 
penetration increased substantially in Asian countries. Arguably, this would have been a 
significant catalyst for change in the domestic banking industry. The commonly used 
measure of the influence of foreign investors is the percentage of foreign ownership of 
individual banks. This measure is recognized as an indicator of external monitoring 
activity, which is expected to improve bank practices. 
This hypothesis is supported if the degree of foreign ownership significantly affects 
the performance of banks. When foreign ownership is measured as the percentage of 
foreign shareholders, greater foreign ownership is expected to contribute to changing 
bank performance by, for example, modernizing operations and improving business 
efficiency. 
 
3. 2 The factors to be controlled for 
Changes in domestic market structure 
The effects of foreign entry can be overestimated because foreign entry may be 
associated with other effects on the market. First, foreign penetration changes the degree 
of market concentration, which in turn affects the performance of domestic banks. This 
effect is supported by traditional hypotheses such as the SCP paradigm and the efficiency 
hypothesis. According to the SCP paradigm, the degree of market concentration has a 
direct influence on the degree of competition between banks in the market. The 
intensified competition caused by the entry of foreign banks changes the behavior of 
banks. The greater is market competition, the greater is the pressure on domestic banks to 
reduce their operational costs and accept lower profits. This hypothesis is supported if the 
degree of market concentration positively affects profits. 
Unlike the SCP paradigm, the efficiency hypothesis recognizes that the relationship 
between market structure and the performance of individual banks is explained by bank 
efficiency.
4  According to this hypothesis, efficient banks gain market share and this 
increases market concentration. As foreign entry increases market competition, domestic 
banks that improve their operational efficiency expand their market share and, 
consequently, market concentration increases. This hypothesis is supported if the 
performance of individual banks positively affects market shares. 
 
Changes in financial regulations 
Barajas et al. (2000) suggest that other liberalization factors should be controlled for 
to avoid overstating the positive effect of foreign bank entry. As Unite and Sullivan 
                                                 
3 According to a provision of the Thai corporate charter, 25% of a company’s outstanding shares 
constitutes a controlling interest (Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1997). However, a shareholder with at least 
20% of the company’s shares has effective control. 
4 According to the contestable-markets hypothesis, the degree of market competition cannot be measured 
by the market concentration ratio. According to this hypothesis, market competition is measured by how 
easily outsiders can enter the market. The easier it is for outsiders to enter the market, the more competitive 
is the market in the sense that incumbents cannot earn excessive profits. 
  6(2003) also point out, it is important to consider the regulatory factors affecting the 
impact of foreign entry. When using time-series data, it is difficult to distinguish the 
effects of foreign bank entry from other effects of financial reforms that have taken place 
simultaneously or following foreign penetration.
5  In studies that focus on individual 
countries, the effects of foreign entry and ownership on bank performance cannot easily 
be disentangled from those of other concurrent financial reforms. 
In the case of Thailand, this problem cannot be ignored. In Thailand, financial 
liberalization was introduced in 1992, whereas the entry of foreign banks increased 
substantially following the 1997 Asian crisis. In the context of financial liberalization, the 
effect of foreign bank entry is supposed to be separable from the effects of financial 
reforms. However, after the financial crisis, when foreign penetration increased 
substantially, the restructuring of domestic banks and a strengthening of prudential 
regulations occurred simultaneously. The influence of these financial reforms must be 
controlled for in the regression analysis. 
 
3.3 Expected changes in bank performance 
As in previous studies, we evaluate the impact of foreign entry on bank operations in 
terms of the effects on operational costs, profitability, and interest rate spreads. 
As the market influence of foreign banks increases, domestic banks are forced to give 
up their sheltered “quiet life” and to exert greater effort to improve cost efficiency 
(Claessens et al. (2001), Berger and Hannan (1998)). Moreover, foreign bank entry 
introduces advanced techniques and skills that are expected to improve the operating 
efficiency of domestic banks. Therefore, in the long run, we can expect increased foreign 
bank presence to increase the cost efficiency of domestic banks. However, improved 
operational efficiency occurs gradually. Immediately after entry by foreign banks, 
domestic banks must invest in modernization. In the short run, as the foreign presence 
increases, the operational costs of domestic banks may increase. 
 
Hypothesis 1. An increase in the foreign presence in the market or in the foreign 
ownership of individual banks increases the operational costs of banks in the short run. 
However, in the long run, it reduces banks’ operational costs. 
 
The rise in the influence of foreign banks leads to greater competition in the domestic 
banking sector. Banks are forced to respond to this increasing competition and, 
consequently, they cease to earn the excessive profits made before foreign bank entry, at 
least in the short run. Therefore, as Barajas et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2001) 
predict, accounting profits are expected to decline. However, the increased influence of 
foreign banks makes domestic banks more profit oriented and more efficient. In the long 
run, as they find alternative income sources to compensate for the loss of traditional 
banking income, the profitability of domestic banks increases again. 
 
Hypothesis 2. An increase in the foreign presence in the market or in foreign ownership 
of individual banks reduces accounting profits in the short run. However, in the long 
run, the profitability of banks tends to increase again. 
                                                 
5  In cross-country studies, it is difficult to separate the effects of foreign bank entry from the effects 
attributed to differences in economic and regulatory factors between countries. 
  7 
Third, interest rate spreads are defined as the difference between the interest earnings 
ratio (interest earnings divided by total lending) and the interest expense ratio (interest 
expenses divided by the sum of deposits and borrowings). The interest rate spread, 
defined in terms of interest rate income, interest rate expenses, or both, is expected to 
decline immediately following a rise in foreign ownership (Barajas et al. (2000), 
Claessens et al. (2001), Unite and Sullivan (2003)). 
 
Hypothesis 3. An increase in the foreign presence in the market or in foreign ownership 
of individual banks reduces interest rate spreads in the short run. However, in the long 
run, the profitability of banks tends to increase again. 
 
4. Development of Foreign Bank Entry in the Thai Market 
 
4.1 Development of foreign bank entry 
Before conducting empirical analysis of the Thai domestic banking market in the next 
section, we provide a brief overview of the main features of the changes in the Thai 
banking market from early 1990s to 2002. 
The Thai financial system changed considerably following the financial liberalization 
of the early 1990s. The financial liberalization measures incorporated the following 
elements of deregulation. In 1990, Thailand accepted the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s Article VIII and abandoned foreign exchange controls on current account 
transactions. Then, in 1991, most restrictions on capital account transactions were 
abandoned. In 1993, to facilitate international borrowing and encourage inflows of funds, 
the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was established. In 1994, regulations 
on outward direct investment, travel expenditure, and other channels of cross-border 
payments were relaxed. Along with these reforms, deregulation measures were 
introduced in Thai banking markets. Commercial banks were permitted to undertake new 
business, and finance and securities companies were allowed to engage in new forms of 
operation. These reforms were pursued under the presumption that financial liberalization 
would promote market competition and improve the Thai financial market. 
However, new foreign banks play less of a role in the financial market than do 
domestic banks. Although the establishment of the BIBF led to increased entry by new 
participants from abroad, these participants were not allowed to provide a full range of 
financial services. The amount of lending by the BIBF and branches of foreign banks 
expanded dramatically and a large amount of foreign capital went into the Thai economy. 
Competition between Thai commercial banks and other nonbank financial institutions 
increased because of the liberalization measures. However, foreign penetration in the 
Thai banking market was limited and foreign banks were segmented from Thai domestic 
banks. 
A significant change in the Thai financial market occurred as part of the financial 
restructuring program following the financial crisis of 1997. That is, the regulation on the 
foreign shareholding limit in Thai commercial banks was relaxed. Following the crisis, 
Thai authorities increased the proportion of shares that foreign investors could hold in 
Thai commercial banks for up to 10 years from 25% to 49%. 
  8As a result, family ownership of Thai banks, which was dominant, significantly 
declined while the share of foreign ownership in domestic commercial banks gradually 
increased. Four of the 15 commercial banks are majority owned by foreign investors; that 
is, foreigners own more than 50% of the shares.
6  The rise in foreign ownership is 
expected to increase competition and affect domestic banks’ performance, positively or 
negatively. 
 
4.2 Data on the Thai banking industry 
Using panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002, below we 
describe key banking sector indicators to examine descriptively the effects of the foreign 
bank presence on domestic bank performance. Table 1 describes the ownership of 
foreign banks and shows how foreign entry has evolved in the Thai banking system. 
Defining foreign-owned banks as those in which foreign investors own more than 50% of 
the total equity implies that all banks were domestically owned before the financial crisis 
of 1997. After the crisis, 13 of 17 banks remained domestically owned and the other four 
were acquired by foreign investors under the financial restructuring reforms that followed 
the crisis. In this sense, given the legal restrictions in place before the crisis, foreign entry 
only occurred from 1998. Market shares and the proportion of foreign banks increased 
following the crisis. However, foreign investors owned equity in some domestic banks 
before the financial crisis and foreign participation in some domestic banks increased 
substantially following the crisis. 
 
Table 1. Evolution of Foreign Bank Entry 
 
Table 2 presents statistics for the interest rate spreads, accounting profits, and 
operating expenses of the 17 domestic Thai banks for the period 1991–2002. These data 
highlight the following points. First, operating expenses rose substantially and, at the 
same time, varied widely between banks after the financial crisis. What is interesting is 
that the operating expenses of foreign-owned banks were clearly higher than those of 
domestic banks. Second, interest rate spreads fell following the crisis. As with 
operational expenses, the interest rate spreads of foreign-owned banks were higher than 
those of domestic banks. Third, profit ratios fell during the crisis period but recovered 
quickly along with the Thai economy. However, even in 2002, profits were substantially 
below their precrisis levels. Although these figures must be interpreted carefully, the 
profit ratios of foreign-owned banks appear lower than those of domestic banks. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables 
 
These descriptive statistics suggest that foreign-owned banks have higher operational 
expenses ratios, higher interest rate spreads, and lower profit ratios than their domestic 
counterparts. Although these findings differ from those for central European and Latin 
American countries, they may reflect the fact that, in Thailand, foreign-owned banks had 
the disadvantage of starting their business operations by acquiring failed domestic banks. 
 
                                                 
6  The four banks are the UOB Radanasin Bank, the Bank of Asia, the Standard Chartered 
Nakornthon Bank, and the DBS Thai Danu Bank. 
  95. Empirical Analysis 
 
We use panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002 to examine 
the effect of foreign bank presence on domestic bank performance. Balance sheet data, 
incomes statements, and ownership data are obtained from the I-SIMS database of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand. The sample period covers the period of financial 
liberalization in Thailand in the first half of the 1990s and the 1997 financial crisis. 
 
5.1 Variable definitions and estimated equations 
Foreign ownership is measured as the percentage of foreign shareholders holding 
more than 50% of all bank stock. In 2002, four of 15 commercial banks were majority 
owned by foreign investors; that is, foreigners owned more than 50% of the shares. 
Although the common stock of the remaining domestic banks is not completely owned by 
foreign banks, the level of foreign ownership has increased considerably, especially since 
the 1997 financial crisis. The rise in foreign ownership is expected to affect domestic 
bank performance.
7  In addition, we control for other factors that may affect bank 
performance, including bank-level variables, market-structure variables, and 
macroeconomic variables. We investigate the effect of foreign bank presence on the 
operations of domestic banks. Three indicators of bank operations are the overhead 
expenses ratio, the profit ratio, and the interest rate spread. 
 
Overhead expenses ratio 
First, overhead expenses (OE) are noninterest expenses, which comprise personnel 
expenses, premises and equipment expenses, fees and services expenses, and other 
noninterest expenses.  0 β  is the constant term (fixed cost). Log (LOAN) is the logarithm 
of the total amount of loans. Wages (WAGE) are personnel expenses per employee. K is 
the ratio of premises and equipment expenses to total assets. The coefficients of output, 
1 β , and those of input prices,  2 β  and  3 β , are expected to be positive. HI is the 
Herfindahl index, which measures the effect of changes in market structure on domestic 
banks. If the market-structure hypothesis is supported,  4 β is positive.
8 
CRISIS is a crisis dummy that equals 1 if t = 1997–1999 and 0 otherwise. We expect 
the coefficient of the crisis dummy, 5 β , to be positively related to operating expenses. 
Banks are expected to face higher operating costs in the postcrisis period. DUMC is a 
financial reform policy dummy, which is equal to 1 if t = 1997–2002 and 0 otherwise. 
Since more stringent prudential regulations were imposed as part of the new financial 
reforms following the Asian crisis, we expect the coefficient of the crisis dummy,  6 β , to 
be positively related to operating expenses. Banks are expected to face higher operating 
costs in the postcrisis period. In addition, we addressed the effect of government 
ownership by including a government dummy (GOV), which is equal to 1 if government 
owns more than 50% of the bank, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
7 See footnote 3. 
8  If the efficiency hypothesis is supported, the coefficient  4 β   is negative. If the contestable-markets 
hypothesis is supported, there is no significant relationship between Herfindahl index and operating 
expenses. 
  10Lastly, operating costs are expected to decline with the increase in foreign ownership, 
FOWN. Domestic banks are forced to give up their sheltered “quiet life” and make 
greater efforts to improve cost efficiency (Claessens et al. (2001), Berger and Hannan 
(1998)). Moreover, foreign bank entry introduces advanced techniques and skills that are 
expected to improve the operating efficiency of domestic banks. Thus, we expect the 
coefficient  8 β to be negative. 
 
it it it
t t it it it it
FOWN GOV DUMC
CRISIS HI K WAGE LOAN OE
ε β β β
β β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 ) log(
     (1) 
 
Bank profitability 
Second, we consider the effect on bank profitability of changes in foreign ownership. 
We use the ratio of earnings before tax to total assets as the proxy for bank’s profitability 
(PROFIT). Wages (WAGE) are personnel expenses per employee. K is the ratio of 
premises and equipment expenses to total assets. IEX is the ratio of interest expenses to 
total deposits. Input prices are expected to be negatively related to the profit ratio. 
Therefore, the coefficients 1 β ,  2 β , and  3 β  should be negative. SPREAD is the difference 
between the ratio of interest income to total loans and the ratio of interest expenses to 
total deposits. Since the interest spread is the main component of a bank’s profit, an 
increase in the interest spread increases profits, and vice versa. Hence, the coefficient  4 β  
is expected to be positive. TA is the total assets of the bank; its coefficient,  , is 
expected to be positive if large banks make larger profits than small banks. 
5 β
If the coefficient on HI (the Herfindahl index),  6 β , is positive, the market-structure 
hypothesis is supported.
9  Since  CRISIS is expected to adversely affect a bank’s 
profitability, the coefficient  is expected to be negative. The effect of government 
ownership is represented by the government dummy, GOV, which is equal to 1 for banks 
that are more than 50% owned by the government and 0 otherwise. The effect of foreign 
ownership (FOWN) on a bank’s profitability is represented by the coefficient, 
7 β
10 β . 
Hence, this coefficient is expected to be negative in the short run and positive in the long 
run. 
 
it it it it t t
it it it t it it
FOWN GOV DUMC CRISIS HI
TA SPREAD IEX K WAGE PROFIT
ε β β β β β
β β β β β β
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 ) log(
   (2) 
 
Interest rate spread 
Third, the interest rate spread (SPREAD) is defined as the difference between the 
interest earnings ratio (interest earnings divided by total lending) and the interest expense 
ratio (interest expenses divided by the sum of deposits and loans). NIA is noninterest 
earnings divided by total assets. Because banks have concentrated more on noninterest 
                                                 
9 If the efficiency hypothesis is supported, the coefficient  6 β  is negative. If the contestable-markets 
hypothesis is supported,  6 β  is zero. 
  11earning assets than their traditional interest earnings, the coefficient 1 β  is expected to be 
positive. FND is the ratio of the sum of deposits and nondeposit loans to total assets and 
OE is the ratio of overhead expenses to total assets. We expect a negative relationship 
between FND and SPREAD and a positive relationship between OE and SPREAD. RSZ 
is relative bank size, which is defined as the bank’s total assets as a percentage of total 
assets for all commercial banks. Since large banks are likely to acquire higher interest 
spreads than small banks, the coefficient 4 β  is expected to be positive. Next, consider the 
macroeconomic variables. We include INF (defined as the percentage change in the CPI) 
and GDP (defined as the percentage change in real GDP). Higher inflation and higher 
GDP growth are expected to be associated with a higher spread. Thus, the coefficients 
 and   are expected to be positive. RR is the reserve requirements ratio. A stricter 
(higher) reserve requirement ratio is expected to lead to lower interest spreads by 
compelling banks to retain more of their equity rather than lending the funds to earn 
interest. Thus, the reserve requirements ratio is expected to be negatively related to the 
interest spread. 
5 β 6 β
As we expect the effects of crisis (CRISIS) and financial restructuring (DUMC) on 
banks’ interest spreads to be negative,  8 β  and  9 β  are expected to be negative. As in the 
cost and profit regressions, government ownership is represented by the government 
dummy,  GOV. The interest rate spread, based on interest rate income, interest rate 
expenses, or both, is expected to decline immediately following a rise in foreign 
ownership (FOWN) (Barajas et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2001), Unite and Sullivan 
(2003)). Thus, the coefficient  11 β   is expected to be negative. The bad-debt ratio is 
controlled for by the inclusion of BADRA, which is defined as the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets. 
 
it it
it it t it t
t t it it t it it
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ε β
β β β β β
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12
11 10 9 8 7
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As shown in Table 3, consistent with the cost-function theory, the coefficients of 
output prices (LOAN) and input prices are positive and most are statistically significant. 
First, the relationship between wages (WAGE) and the operating expenses ratio is 
positive and statistically significant. The higher are wages, the larger are overhead 
expenses. The coefficients of the equipment expenses ratio (K) are positive and most are 
statistically significant. The coefficients of output prices (LOAN) are positive but not all 
are statistically significant. The coefficients of output prices are less than 1, which 
suggests the existence of scale economies in the commercial bank market. The 
Herfindahl index (HI), which is a market-structure variable, is significantly negatively 
related to cost. The evidence is not consistent with the SCP hypothesis. Rather, the 
  12evidence supports the efficiency hypothesis.
10 A highly efficient bank that provides better 
services increases its market share in a more highly concentrated market. Thus, such 
banks have higher profits and lower operating costs. 
 
Table 3. Operating Expenses 
 
Consider now the effects of the macroeconomic variables on banks’ operating costs. 
The coefficient of the crisis dummy (CRISIS) is positive but not statistically significant. 
This is because, given significant changes in the amount of loans and in interest rates, the 
introduction of new regulations, and changes in the environment following the crisis, it is 
difficult to clearly ascertain the impact of the crisis on operating expenses. However, the 
positive sign of the crisis dummy implies that banks, in general, tended to have higher 
operating expenses in the aftermath of financial crisis, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the financial restructuring variable (DUMC) is 
positive and significantly related to the cost ratio. This emphasizes the effect of financial 
restructuring on banks’ operating expenses. In the postcrisis period, since numerous 
banks laid off employees and adopted early retirement programs (to reduce long-run 
personnel expenses), banks, at least in the short run, had higher personnel expenses. In 
addition, to compete with new foreign bank entrants, new and advanced technologies and 
equipment were introduced, and this led to higher initial operating expenses. 
Unlike in previous studies, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between foreign bank presence (FOWN) and operating costs. As shown in Table 3, a rise 
in the foreign bank presence leads to an increase in operating costs for domestic banks. 
This may be because the entry of foreign banks has forced domestic banks to invest in 
new facilities and advanced technologies. At the same time, although domestic banks 
have improved cost efficiency to enable them to compete in the new environment, they 
are still in the process of restructuring by, for example, laying off employees and making 
provisions for nonperforming loans. Consequently, at least in the short term, the 
operating costs ratio tends to increase in response to the entry of foreign banks. The 
effects of foreign bank entry do not change when we control for the impact of the 




According to Table 4, as expected, wages (WAGE) and interest expenses (IEX) are 
significantly negative related to before-tax profit ratios. The higher are expenses (wages 
and interest expenses), the lower are profits. Also as expected, the interest rate spread 
(SPREAD) is statistically significant and positively related to the profit ratio. However, 
the coefficient of the equipment expenses ratio (K) is not statistically significant. Total 
assets (TA)  are significantly positively related to the profit ratio, which suggests the 
presence of scale economies. The results support the efficiency hypothesis. Given a more 
competitive market, following financial deregulation, highly efficient banks increased 
                                                 
10 According to the efficiency hypothesis, the relationship between market structure and performance is 
determined by the efficiency of the firm. A highly efficient firm can increase its market share and this can 
lead to increased concentration. Consequently, overall performance is improved. 
  13their market shares and improved their profitability. Inefficient banks were unable to 
compete, and their market shares and profits declined. 
 
Table 4. Bank profits 
 
Like in the cost function, the crisis dummy (CRISIS) is not statistically significant, 
but the effect of financial restructuring (DUMC) on banks’ profit ratios is significantly 
negative. As already mentioned, the introduction of new equipment and technology, 
given bad debts and losses from debt restructuring, reduced profitability following the 
crisis. 
Profit is significantly and negatively related to an increase in the foreign bank 
presence (FOWN). As already mentioned, an increase in foreign ownership increases 
competition in the banking market. Consequently, the market shares and profitability of 
banks (particularly the uncompetitive and inefficient ones) fell initially as foreign 
ownership increased. Consistent with the arguments of existing surveys, we suggest that, 
because of the introduction of new technologies and financial products (following the 
entry of foreign banks), expenses were incurred and thus, at least in the short term, profits 
declined. Including the crisis dummy or the financial restructuring dummy made no 
significant difference to our results. 
 
Interest rate spread 
Next, we examine the regression for the interest rate spread. We find evidence that a 
reduction in the noninterest earnings assets ratio (NIA) is associated with a decline in the 
interest spread. This is because banks become more conservative in their lending and 
search for new income sources so that they do not have to rely on traditional interest 
earnings. However, in a highly competitive environment, it is difficult to find new 
sources of income. The coefficient of the funding ratio (FND) is not significantly related 
to the interest spread. The overhead expenses ratio (OE) is positively related to the spread 
but is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5. Interest Rate Spread 
 
The coefficient of RSZ indicates that relatively smaller banks have smaller interest 
spreads. That is, smaller banks have lower interest spreads than larger banks. Larger 
banks tend to be able to raise funds more cheaply than smaller banks. Hence, large banks 
have higher interest spreads than small banks. 
Turning to the macroeconomic variables, the coefficients of the inflation rate and 
GDP growth are negative but not statistically significant. Because higher reserve 
requirements (RR) reduce the level of funds available for earning interest, the spread is 
expected to decline as RR increases. However, we find a positive relationship between 
interest rate spreads and the reserve requirement. Following Unite and Sullivan (2003), 
this may be related to the timing of changes in the reserve requirements by the Central 
Bank. The Bank of Thailand increases reserve requirements when bank interest rate 
spreads are increasing and decreases reserve requirements when bank interest rate 
spreads are declining. 
  14Although we find that CRISIS has a statistically significant negative effect on interest 
rate spreads, we also find that financial restructuring (DUMC) has a statistically 
significant positive effect on spreads. The effect of the crisis, in the short run, may have 
reduced the ability of banks to obtain high interest rate spreads. Banks may have found it 
more difficult to gain higher interest earnings than before because of the increase in 
market competition. However, given the strict financial restructuring, banks might be 
able to gain higher spreads (either from greater interest income or from lower interest 
expenses) in the longer term. 
We find that the presence of foreign banks (FOWN) has a significantly positive effect 
on interest rate spreads. The greater is the extent of foreign ownership of banks, the 
greater are the interest rate spreads of domestic banks. As in the context of the cost and 
profit regressions, our estimation results are essentially unaffected by the inclusion of the 
crisis dummy and the financial restructuring dummy. An increase in spreads can be due 
to either an increase in interest income, a decline in interest expenses, or both. Interest 
expenses may fall as the large domestic banks that remain attract the major share of 
deposits, particularly following the crisis, whereas new foreign banks might need more 
time to compete effectively in the market. Interest income increases because foreign 
banks tend to lend more funds to new customers in order to increase their loan portfolios, 
whereas domestic banks tend to lend more conservatively because of their problems with 
nonperforming loans. 
An interesting finding is the positive effect on banks’ interest spreads of the 
government dummy (GOV). Hence, government-owned banks tend to have higher 
interest rate spreads than private banks. The effect of the bad debt ratio (BADRA) on 




In this paper, we investigated the impact of foreign bank entry on Thai domestic 
banks by using panel data on 17 domestic commercial banks from 1990 to 2002. We 
extended the seminal work of Chantapong by enlarging the scope of study and by 
undertaking a more rigorous and comprehensive analysis. First, whereas Chantapong 
focuses on the postcrisis period (1995–2001), we examined the entire development period 
of foreign entry from the 1990s. Second, while Chantapong’s approach to estimation is 
ad hoc and lacks theoretical foundations, in this paper, we estimated equations based on 
microeconomic analysis. Third, compared with Chantapong's study, we examined the 
effects of a wider range of factors affecting bank performance; we included changes in 
the foreign ownership of banks, change in financial regulations, and changes in market 
structure. 
We found that an increase in foreign bank presence leads to a rise in overhead 
expenses, a decline in profits, and an increase in the interest rate spreads of domestic 
banks. In the short run, foreign bank entry is likely to negatively affect the operations of 
domestic banks by increasing competition. In the long run, however, the overall 
performance of banks is expected to improve. 
In addition to increased foreign entry, we also found that market structure, 
represented by the market concentration ratio, affects bank performance. We also found 
evidence that other aspects of regulation significantly affected bank behavior. Following 
  15the financial crisis, the introduction of more stringent financial regulations tended to 
increase banks’ operating costs and reduced profit ratios. These results support recent 
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Table 3. Operating Expenses 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Log(LOAN)  0.066  0.090 0.063*** 0.062 
  (0.381)  (0.226) (0) (0.393) 
WAGE  1.615*** 1.403*** 1.329***  1.329* 
  (0) (0.001) (0) (0.002) 
K  0.259** 0.281** 0.233**  0.193 
  (0.029) (0.018) (0.044) (0.106) 
HI  –9.249*** –11.446***  –5.704**  –5.173*** 
  (0) (0)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
CRISIS  0.110  0.085  0.080 
  (0.103)  (0.202)  (0.229) 
DUMC     0.203***  0.226 
     (0)  (0.008) 
GOV      –0.000001 
      (0.723) 
FOWN  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
OBS  135 135 135 134 
R^2  0.947 0.946 0.949 0.950 
 
Note: Log (LOAN) is the logarithm of total loans. WAGE is personnel expenses per employee. K is the 
ratio of premises and equipment expenses to total assets. HI is the Herfindahl index. CRISIS is a crisis 
dummy that equals 1 if t = 1997–1999 and 0 otherwise. DUMC is a financial restructuring dummy that 
equals 1 if t = 1997–2002 and 0 otherwise. GOV represents state ownership and equals 1 for banks that are 
more than 50% owned by government and 0 otherwise. FOWN is the percentage of foreign ownership. 
Values in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  20 
Table 4. Profit Ratio 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
WAGE  –0.036*** –0.038***  –0.033**  –0.025*  –0.122** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.016) (0.074) (0.031) 
K  0.012 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.010 
  (0.439) (0.342) (0.403) (0.356) (0.532) 
IEX  –0.631*** –0.535*** –0.680*** –1.131*** –0.712*** 
  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
SPREAD  2.552*** 2.531*** 2.361*** 1.997*** 2.385*** 
  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
LOG(TA)  0.059*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
HI  0.653***  0.446 0.323 0.249 0.379 
  (0.001) (0.129) (0.307) (0.373) (0.235) 
CRISIS    0.011 –0.003 0.030 –0.001 
    (0.329) (0.796) (0.132) (0.915) 
DUMC     –0.013  –0.049**  –0.018 
     (0.473)  (0.033)  (0.205) 
GOV       –0.0000001
       (0.836) 
FOWN  –0.0005** –0.0005** –0.0005**  –0.0004*  –0.0004* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.057) (0.046) 
DUMC*FOWN     –0.0004    
     (0.632)    
OBS 135 135 135 135 134 
R^2  0.759 0.759 0.759 0.766 0.757 
 
Note: The profit ratio is defined as earnings before tax divided by total assets. Log (TA) is the logarithm of 
total assets. WAGE is personnel expenses per employee. K is the ratio of premises and equipment expenses 
to total assets. IEX is defined as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. SPREAD is the difference 
between the ratio of interest income to total loans and the ratio of interest expenses on total deposits. HI is 
the Herfindahl index. CRISIS is a crisis dummy that equals 1 if t = 1997–1999 and 0 otherwise. DUMC is a 
financial restructuring dummy that equals 1 if t = 1997–2002 and 0 otherwise. GOV represents state 
ownership and equals 1 for banks that are more than 50% owned by government and 0 otherwise. FOWN is 
the percentage of foreign ownership. Values in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 5. Interest Spread 
 
 1  2  3  4 
NIA  0.506*** 0.376**  0.348** 0.367** 
  (0.001) (0.030) (0.040)  (0.030) 
FND  0.022 0.019 0.025  0.036 
  (0.357) (0.443) (0.309)  (0.194) 
OE  0.021 0.034 0.033  0.026 
  (0.713) (0.558) (0.551)  (0.642) 
RSZ  0.105** 0.101***  0.101***  0.100** 
  (0.011) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.006) 
INF  –0.0008  –0.0008  –0.0009 
  (0.371)  (0.408)  (0.357) 
GDP  0.0002  0.0002  0.0001 
  (0.749)  (0.683)  (0.830) 
RR  2.992*** 2.804*** 2.889***  2.933*** 
  (0) (0) (0)  (0) 
CRISIS  –0.014*** –0.018*** –0.014***  –0.014*** 
  (0) (0) (0)  (0) 
DUMC  0.011** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.011** 
  (0.019) (0) (0.011)  (0.017) 
GOV   –0.011***  –0.011***  –0.011*** 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
FOWN  0.0001** 0.0009* 0.00009*  0.0001** 
  (0.012) (0.081) (0.062)  (0.044) 
BADRA      –0.002 
      (0.430) 
NOB 135  134  135  135 
R^2 0.516  0.596  0.602  0.590 
 
The dependent variable is SPREAD, which is defined as the difference between the ratio of interest income 
to total loans and the ratio of interest expenses on total deposits. NIA is the ratio of noninterest earnings to 
total assets. FND is the sum of deposit funding and nondeposit funding of total assets. OE is the ratio of 
overhead expenses to total assets. RSZ is relative bank size, which is defined as the assets of each bank as a 
percentage of total assets for all commercial banks. INF is the percentage change in the CPI. GDP is the 
percentage change in real GDP. RR is the reserve requirements ratio. CRISIS is a crisis dummy that equals 
1 if t = 1997–1999 and 0 otherwise. DUMC is a financial restructuring dummy that equals 1 if t = 1997–
2002 and 0 otherwise. GOV represents state ownership and equals 1 for banks that are more than 50% 
owned by government and 0 otherwise. FOWN is the percentage of foreign ownership. BADRA is the bad-
debt ratio, which is defined as the ratio of bad debts to total loans. Values in parentheses are p-values. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 